Is EU Supranational Governance a
Challenge to Liberal Constitutionalism?
Gráinne de Búrca†
Does supranational governance present a challenge to liberal constitutionalism? More particularly, has the European Union’s supranational form of governance fueled the rise of illiberal authoritarianism and undermined liberal constitutionalism? This Essay first addresses two related empirical questions associated
with this larger query: first, whether the Brexit vote reflected a rise in authoritarianism and a turn against liberal constitutionalism; and second, whether the
Euroscepticism to which the process of European integration has given rise has also
contributed to the growth of the illiberal far right across the European Union and to
the weakening of support for liberal constitutionalism. The third part addresses a
broader and more conceptual question about the relationship between supranational governance and liberal constitutionalism—namely, whether there is something either inherent or contingent in the structure and process of European integration and in the project of European supranational governance that creates a
challenge to liberal constitutionalism and, if so, what kind of challenge.

INTRODUCTION
The European Union was founded in the 1950s as an experiment in postwar regional integration, in part to help rebuild
national economies damaged by World War II through economic
integration, and in part to ward off, by means of closer legal and
political integration of states, the threat of totalitarianism and
Soviet expansion.1 For a number of decades the experiment in
European integration made considerable progress toward these
goals, deepening economic, legal, and political integration at the
same time as it expanded to include many of the Central and
Eastern Europe Countries (CEEC).2 The project of eastward
expansion also meant that the European Union came to be viewed
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1
For an analysis of the origins of the European Union, see generally Alan S.
Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Routledge 1992).
2
See generally Marise Cremona, ed, The Enlargement of the European Union
(Oxford 2003).
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not just as a project of economic and political integration of
Western Europe, but also one of democratization and democracy
promotion.
The imposition of a form of political conditionality on the process of accession to the European Union had begun in the 1970s
and 1980s when Spain, Portugal, and Greece were admitted following periods of domestic dictatorship.3 This process was expanded and formalized in the 1990s with the adoption of the
Copenhagen criteria by the EU heads of state in the European
Council prior to the opening of accession negotiations with the
CEEC.4 These criteria are a set of requirements that commit all
states seeking to join the European Union to respect the principles on which it is founded—namely, “the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
and of the rule of law”5—and that are now enshrined in Article 49
and Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).6 Further, since 1997, the TEU has included a procedure, known as the
Article 7 sanction mechanism, that provides for the possible suspension of voting rights of an EU member state that seriously and
persistently breaches these principles.7
In other words, the European Union, as it stands today,
seems to be designed at least in part to protect and promote
democracy and liberal constitutionalism, rather than to undermine or weaken it. Why then do we need to pose the question
whether supranational governance presents a challenge to liberal
constitutionalism? A first answer is that the European Union—
particularly since the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,
which heralded the move from an “economic community” to a

3
See generally Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, Legacies and Leverage:
EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective, 62 EurAsia Stud 443 (2010); Viljar Veebel, European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in
Pre-accession Process, 13 Trames 207, 213–20 (2009).
4
See European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency *13 (June 21–22, 1993), archived at http://perma.cc/42XZ-8YLS (“Membership requires that the candidate country
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces
within the Union.”).
5
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 55 J EU C326 13, 15
(2012) (“TEU”).
6
See TEU Arts 6(1), 49, 55 J EU C326 at 19, 43.
7
TEU Art 7, 55 J EU C326 at 19–20.
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more ambitious political union with a single currency8—has experienced a series of ongoing challenges to its legitimacy, including recurrent allegations of a “democratic deficit.” Secondly, the
European Union over the past decade has been roiled by a series
of even sharper crises, including the Euro crisis and the refugee
crisis, leading to a set of challenges that go well beyond the
democratic-deficit critique. Among them is the rise within many
member states of Eurosceptical political movements, in some
cases accompanied by a growth in support for illiberal authoritarian government, as seen most strikingly in Poland and
Hungary.
Further, the Brexit vote of a majority of the UK population in
2016 to leave the European Union has presented another major
problem for the European Union. The apparent similarities between the wider move against liberal constitutionalism described
in the Symposium Introduction9 and some of the causes and manifestations of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom raise the
question whether the vote itself can be understood as part of this
wider move away from liberal constitutionalism and toward increasingly authoritarian rule.
In what follows, three questions are addressed. The first is
whether the Brexit vote can indeed be understood as part of the
move away from liberal constitutionalism, or whether this
claim overstates the similarity between the UK vote to leave
the European Union and the erosion of constitutional democracy
in other states. The second is whether the EU project of regional
integration may be partly responsible for the rise of authoritarianism and the decline in support for liberal constitutionalism
within several of the EU member states. The third and final question is whether the EU form of supranational governance itself
presents a challenge to liberal constitutionalism, as defined in the
Symposium Introduction.10

8

Maastricht Treaty Title II, 35 J EU C191 1, 5 (1992).
See Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq, and Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal
Constitutionalism?, 85 U Chi L Rev 239, 239–42 (2018).
10 Professors Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq, and Mila Versteeg have described liberal
constitutionalism as entailing: a written constitution including an enumeration of individual rights; the existence of rights-based judicial review; a heightened threshold for constitutional amendment; a commitment to persisting democratic elections; and a commitment
to the rule of law, understood as ensuring that administrative and adjudicative functions that operate autonomously from, and potentially limit, powerful factions or leaders.
Id at 239.
9
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I. DID THE BREXIT VOTE REFLECT A DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM?
On one interpretation, the vote of a majority of the population of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union had
little to do with a rejection of liberal constitutionalism. The
strongly Eurosceptic sentiment that underpinned much of the
“leave” vote—a sentiment that has been prominent in the United
Kingdom since it first joined the European Economic Community
(EEC) in 1973, fluctuating at times but rising in recent years11—
was skeptical of the European Union and the benefits of European
integration, but not necessarily skeptical of Britain’s traditional
democratic system. The strongest two factors that appear to have
led those voting against EU membership to do so were specific
concerns over immigration and a more general desire to regain
“control,” including control of the economy, of borders, and of lawmaking.12 Indeed, a popular referendum is certainly at least one
dimension of democracy in practice, albeit one which can be in
tension with elements of representative democracy or with minority rights and other constitutional guarantees. And the design of
the Brexit referendum has been criticized on account of its failure to build in safeguards like a supermajority requirement or a
“double-lock threshold” to reflect the role of the devolved regions
in the UK.13 Nevertheless, the concerns over immigration and
desire for greater national control that were reflected in the
British vote to leave the European Union do not necessarily
imply a rejection of liberal constitutionalism or a vote for illiberal authoritarianism.
Indeed, the Brexit vote could reasonably be understood as the
almost inevitable consequence of the immense gamble of putting to
a popular vote (on perhaps any number of occasions over the past
thirty years) the question of UK membership in the European
Union. Despite the shock with which the result of the vote was
11 See Roger Mortimore, Polling History: 40 Years of British Views on ‘In or Out’ of
Europe (The Conversation, June 21, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/U245-DH3Q.
12 See Brexit Britain: British Election Study Insights from the Post-EU Referendum
Wave of the BES Internet Panel (British Election Study, June 10, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/7SZ4-NZXG; Matthew J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-Level Analysis of the Result, 87 Polit Q 323,
324–25 (2016).
13 See Allan F. Tatham, “The Art of Falling Apart?”: Constitutional Conundrums
Surrounding a Potential Brexit *6–7 (CSF-SSSUP Working Paper Series, Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XF3Z-BC9Q; Kenneth Rogoff, Britain’s Democratic Failure
(Project Syndicate, June 24, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/TM5D-HGG8.
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greeted, it was in many respects a predictable outcome given how
continuously contested and difficult the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union has been ever since it joined.
The United Kingdom initially sought EU membership for largely
pragmatic economic reasons rather than any commitment to being part of a European political unity.14 Throughout its more than
forty-year membership, Britain never subscribed to or supported
the vision of European integration accepted by many, if not most,
other member states.
On the contrary, the United Kingdom adopted a pragmatic
and often ad hoc approach to its EU membership, with numerous
opt-outs and special treatment sought over the years. While other
member states expressed reservations at various times about aspects of EU policy and sought occasional opt-outs for particular
interests and issues,15 the United Kingdom nonetheless remained
quite exceptional if not exceptionalist in its attitude toward the
European Union, and the attitude of its government in general
largely reflected public opinion. Britain sought and received special treatment in relation to the so-called EU budget rebate,16 and
it adopted a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to the introduction
of new areas of EU policy. Thus, the United Kingdom secured optouts on a range of issues on which it was unwilling to countenance
closer integration. Notably, these included reprieves from economic and monetary union (EMU) and Justice and Home Affairs
at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, with other shorter-lived or
less successful attempts seen in the Social Protocol attached to
the Maastricht Treaty17 and the more recent Protocol on the
Charter of Fundamental Rights attached to the Lisbon Treaty.18
14 See Nauro Campos and Fabrizio Coricelli, Why Did Britain Join the EU? A New Insight from Economic History (Vox EU, Feb 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SS7K-PR3N.
15 Denmark and Ireland, for example, have chosen to opt out from some of the EU
provisions on Justice and Home Affairs, and Denmark and Sweden have chosen to remain
outside the euro. Various other minor opt-outs have been secured from time to time by
other EU members, but no member state has requested and obtained the number and
range of opt-outs that the United Kingdom consistently has. See Mark Briggs, Europe ‘à
la Carte’: The Whats and Whys behind UK Opt-Outs (Euractiv, May 12, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/8B9J-ZG3R.
16 See generally Alessandro D’Alfonso, The UK ‘Rebate’ on the EU Budget: An Explanation of the Abatement and Other Correction Mechanisms (European Parliamentary
Research Service, Feb 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/73S7-KEQG.
17 See, for example, Brian Towers, Two Speed Ahead: Social Europe and the UK after
Maastricht, 23 Indust Rel J 83, 85 (1992); Gerda Falkner, The Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy: Theory and Practice, 6 J Eur Soc Pol 1, 9–10 (1996).
18 See generally Catherine Barnard, The ‘Opt-Out’ for the UK and Poland from the
Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?, in Stefan Griller and
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Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom, as evidenced also by
opinion poll research,19 has long predated the current wave of populism sweeping the democratic world,20 and it has expressed itself
for the most part not as a rejection of liberal democratic values
but as something that could even be presented as the opposite: a
refusal to be “ruled from abroad,” as voters understood it, and
a rejection of the primacy of “continental” and unresponsive
European supranational law over domestic constitutional law and
domestic democratic institutions. On this reading, despite the
similarity in the salience of the issues of immigration, economic
insecurity, and nationalism, the Brexit vote to leave the European
Union might perhaps not be so easily categorized with the various
political movements in other European states and the United
States that seem to challenge core aspects of constitutional democracy and to advance illiberal populism. Despite the antisystem flavor of the referendum, the apparent wish of many of
those who voted for Brexit could be said to have been to reject
the European Union’s role in the United Kingdom, rather than to
replace or undermine aspects of the British democratic and constitutional system.
Yet at the same time, this first interpretation of the Brexit
referendum overlooks various features of the vote and particularly the nature of the issues that fanned the flames of the longstanding, latent Euroscepticism that eventually led to a majority
vote in favor of withdrawal from the European Union. Certain aspects of the vote and its underlying causes resonate clearly with
what was referred to in the Symposium Introduction as the
“right-leaning populist explosion” across Europe and Asia.21
While the Brexit debate in the United Kingdom did not generally
entail calls or proposals to repudiate liberal norms of tolerance,
restrict press freedom, or undermine the rule of law, certain
dimensions of the vote to leave—and perhaps particularly the dimensions that tipped the balance this time toward a “no” vote—
suggest that important elements of the illiberal populism evident

Jacques Ziller, eds, The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional
Treaty? 257 (SpringerWienNewYork 2008).
19 See Mortimore, Polling History (cited in note 11).
20 See generally Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945
(Routledge 2002).
21 See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 240 (cited in note 9) (quotation marks omitted).
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elsewhere in Europe and beyond were present also in the UK debate and in the size of the vote to leave.
In the first place, various analyses of the British vote postreferendum indicate that the issue of immigration and the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiment played a very significant role
in the vote.22 While concern over immigration is not necessarily
illiberal, widespread anti-immigrant sentiment during the Brexit
campaign erupted regularly into xenophobic discourse and racism, as was widely reported in the British media at the time.23
Further, according to police records, the period following the referendum vote showed a sharp rise in hate crimes directed at migrants and refugees.24
In the second place, a clear correlation between anti-EU sentiment and attachment to authoritarian values was identified in
a number of post-referendum studies of the Brexit vote. In particular, it seems that 66 percent of those who voted to leave the
European Union identified themselves as having values that were
coded as “authoritarian” on the authoritarian–libertarian scale.25
Attachment to these authoritarian values was revealed in responses to a range of questions, such as those concerning how
children should be raised and attitudes toward the death penalty,

22 See Kirby Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote *13 (NatCen Social Research,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/X5ES-2MFF; Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin, and
Paul Whiteley, Why Britain Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016
Referendum Vote, 70 Parliamentary Aff 439, 453 (2017).
23 See, for example, Brett Arends, Brexit Campaign Devolves into Racism and Xenophobia (MarketWatch, June 15, 2016), online at http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/brexit-campaign-devolves-into-racism-and-xenophobia-2016-06-15 (visited Dec 13,
2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
24 See Jon Burnett, Racial Violence and the Brexit State *13 (Institute of Race
Relations, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/G45C-BKY3. For media reports, see
Katie Forster, Hate Crimes Soared by 41% after Brexit Vote, Official Figures Reveal
(The Independent, Oct 13, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8WGV-WSXT; Homa
Khaleeli, ‘A Frenzy of Hatred’: How to Understand Brexit Racism (The Guardian, June 29,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/S7LT-BPTJ.
25 See Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote at *16 (cited in note 22). See also Eric
Kaufmann, It’s NOT the Economy, Stupid: Brexit as a Story of Personal Values (London
School of Economics, July 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/64C6-7BF2. Political values
in the United Kingdom have for some decades been measured by social scientists on a
libertarian–authoritarian scale as well as a left–right scale, see, for example, UK Parties
2017 General Election (Political Compass, Aug 22, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/7SR4-LYTJ, and it seems that the libertarian–authoritarian cleavage was
much more significant in the Brexit vote than the left–right cleavage.

344

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:337

but also in responses indicating a preference in certain circumstances for order over personal freedom.26
Thirdly, in the aftermath of the vote to leave the European
Union, a more vocally illiberal element has been present in the
public debate. There were extraordinary verbal attacks by the
popular tabloid press on the judiciary. Headlines proclaimed the
judges of the High Court to be “enemies of the people” following
the R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union27
case.28 Miller declared that a decision to trigger Article 50 of the
TEU, which would begin the countdown to withdrawal, required
a parliamentary vote.29 Further, there has been intense pressure
to effectively entrench the result of the (nonbinding) referendum
vote and to treat any debate or discussion of the merits of the vote
as a betrayal of the people’s voice.30
Fourthly, one of the sources of opposition to the European
Union among an important category of pro-Brexit voters was the
role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its rulings on the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.31 This objection to European
adjudication of issues raising human-rights claims in the United
Kingdom, and its prominence in the Brexit debate, extended also
to the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
in Strasbourg, which although not formally part of the EU system
is closely linked to it. Thus Theresa May—in her capacity as

26 The issues on which they were asked whether they agreed or disagreed included
the following: (1) Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values; (2) People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences; (3) For some crimes,
the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence; (4) Schools should teach children to
obey authority; (5) The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong;
(6) Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. See Swales,
Understanding the Leave Vote at *28 (cited in note 22).
27 [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin).
28 See James Slack, Enemies of the People: Fury over ‘Out of Touch’ Judges Who Have
‘Declared War on Democracy’ by Defying 17.4m Brexit Voters and Who Could Trigger Constitutional Crisis (Daily Mail, Nov 4, 2016), online at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-Brexit-voters-trigger
-constitutional-crisis.html (visited Oct 16, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
29 Miller, [2016] EWHC 2768 at ¶¶ 92–93. The judgment of the Supreme Court on
appeal was given on January 24, 2017. See R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union, [2017] UKSC 5.
30 See Anatole Kaletsky, Tony Blair’s Democratic Insurrection (Project Syndicate,
Feb 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/A6SA-CQDM.
31 An influential blog article published in February 2016 by Marina Wheeler, a senior
lawyer and the spouse of Boris Johnson, the then–London mayor who led the Brexit campaign, argued that the power of the ECJ had been extended too far by the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. See Marina Wheeler, Cavalier with Our Constitution: A Charter Too
Far (UK Human Rights Blog, Feb 9, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/K8QV-8UJD.
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then–Home Secretary in April 2016—called for UK withdrawal
from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and
despite mixed messages from the British government on this subject since that time, the question of withdrawal from the ECHR,
repeal of the UK Human Rights Act, and rejection of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECJ
have been treated as closely related in the Brexit and postBrexit debate.32
Hence the Brexit vote, while on a first analysis may not
appear to have much in common with the spread of illiberal
authoritarianism in countries like Poland and Hungary, does
share a number of relevant features, including (i) a strong antiimmigration and anti-immigrant dimension, (ii) an increasingly
publicly expressed intolerance (fueled by the tabloid media) toward dissent or disagreement with the voice of the “people” as
taken to be expressed by the June 2016 vote, (iii) the fact that a
majority of those who were identified in a poll as adhering to
authoritarian values voted for Brexit, and (iv) a rejection of humanrights adjudication by European courts. The British political system did not move toward becoming an illiberal authoritarian regime in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, but many of the elements
that have come to prominence in other states and that have fueled
the rise of illiberal regimes in those other countries were also present in the United Kingdom, with the vote revealing a very divided society sharply split between those on the authoritarian
and those on the liberal side of the political spectrum. The risk
recently articulated by several political science scholars that the
discourse, policies, and preferences of the vocal far right (including their populist illiberalism) is likely to strongly influence the
programs and actions of mainstream and centrist parties, is
clearly present in the post-Brexit United Kingdom.33
32 See Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, UK Must Leave European Convention
on Human Rights, Says Theresa May (The Guardian, Apr 25, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/J3DD-9VJH; Ed Bates, Is the UK Going to Withdraw from the ECHR?
What about the Human Rights Act? (ukstrasbourgspotlight, Mar 10, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/CX8U-LBFR. For an analysis by the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Human Rights, see generally House of Common and House of Lords Joint Committee
on Human Rights, The Human Rights Implications of Brexit (Dec 19, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/U3V9-NEHV.
33 See Cas Mudde, On Extremism and Democracy in Europe 145–48 (Routledge
2016). Professor Cas Mudde warns that democracy in Europe is under threat from the
liberal elite, who are choosing to adapt their programs and policies (on issues such as
migration, refugees, and multiculturalism) to the agenda of the far right in order to win
voters.
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These elements in the Brexit debate, however, do not necessarily establish that the European Union presents a challenge to
liberal constitutionalism, even if they indicate that a significant part
of the opposition to the European Union in the United Kingdom was
illiberal in nature, involving a strong reaction against migration
and migrants, and against rights adjudication by European
judges, and toward the identification of the Brexit majority vote
as the true voice of the people. The question whether the process
of European integration has generated such reactions elsewhere
in the European Union is explored in the next Part.
II. HAS EU INTEGRATION PLAYED A PART IN THE RISE IN
SUPPORT FOR ILLIBERAL AUTHORITARIAN PARTIES ACROSS
MEMBER STATES AND A DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM?
It is certainly clear that the process of European integration
has given rise to political and social movements opposed to the
European Union and to the project of integration, a phenomenon
that is commonly known as Euroscepticism.34 One empirical question arising from this fact is whether the growth of Euroscepticism
in response to European integration has fueled the decline in
support for liberal constitutionalism and the rise of illiberal
authoritarianism.
This is a complex question, and one that cannot be answered
with any degree of accuracy without careful empirical analysis of
a range of countries over time. For present purposes, I will simply
identify and describe a set of distinct phenomena that bear on the
question, and consider some of the possible relationships between
them. There are at least three movements or sets of developments
across various states of the European Union that seem relevant
to the question. The first is the steady growth of Euroscepticism
over several decades, the second is the gradual rise of the far right
across Europe, and the third is the more general turn in many
European countries (including EU states) against what has been
described as global neoliberal capitalism.
The first of these, the rise of Euroscepticism, has been the
subject of intensive study and analysis since the mid-1990s, when
it initially began to manifest in the aftermath of the Maastricht
Treaty and the move from the EEC to the European Union. The
34 For an early collection of essays on Eurosceptical thought, see generally Martin
Holmes, ed, The Eurosceptical Reader (St. Martin’s 1996).
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opposition that began to grow was, in a sense, a challenge to the
elite consensus in favor of European integration that had prevailed since the 1950s, together with the assumption of a popular
“permissive consensus” accompanying this elite support.35 With
the introduction of economic and monetary union, a common foreign and security policy, and an aspiration toward political union
in the Maastricht treaty in 1993, political opposition toward the
European Union began to develop in earnest.36 Since that time,
Euroscepticism—and particularly what has been termed “hard”
Euroscepticism entailing opposition to the very idea of European
integration, rather than “soft” Euroscepticism entailing objection
to some of the EU policies and direction—has continued to rise
steadily.37 This Euroscepticism has not been the domain exclusively of the right or the far right, however. On the contrary, there
has always been a strand of Euroscepticism on the left.38 Nevertheless, left-wing Euroscepticism has been a less prominent
strand than that of the Eurosceptical right, and unlike rightwing Euroscepticism, which has generally opposed the project of
European integration, left-wing Euroscepticism has broadly been
in favor of reform of the European Union rather than outright
opposition to its existence.39
However, with the two major crises that hit the European Union from 2007 onwards—first, the European debt and banking crisis, followed by the refugee and migrant crisis—Euroscepticism
has grown more steeply, in particular the harder variety that opposes European integration per se rather than seeking reform of
the European Union.40 The issues that appear most regularly to
35 See Ian Down and Carole J. Wilson, From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘Constraining
Dissensus’: A Polarizing Union?, 43 Acta Politica 26, 46 (2008).
36 For an important early paper, see generally Paul Taggart, A Touchstone of Dissent:
Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems, 33 Eur J Polit Rsrch
363 (1998).
37 See Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation *6–8 (Sussex European Institute Working
Paper No 36, Oct 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/SQ7A-86GT. For a challenge to the
hard/soft classification, see Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, Two Sides of Euroscepticism:
Party Positions on European Integration in Central Europe, 3 EU Polit 297, 300 (2002).
38 See Maurits J. Meijers, Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism: A Dynamic Phenomenon *6–7 (Jacques Delors Institut Berlin, Apr 7 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/F4Y4-RCWY.
39 See Erika J. van Elsas, Armen Hakhverdian, and Wouter van der Brug, United
against a Common Foe? The Nature and Origins of Euroscepticism among Left-Wing and
Right-Wing Citizens, 39 W Eur Polit 1181, 1186 (2016).
40 For some of the media commentary on the results of the 2014 European Parliament
elections, see Eurosceptic ‘Earthquake’ Rocks EU Elections (BBC, May 26, 2014), archived
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underpin Euroscepticism today are an overall objection to the dilution of national sovereignty and a belief that freer transnational
economic exchange in general and immigration in particular are
exacerbating economic insecurity and cultural disruption. At the
same time, it seems that the issue of support for (or opposition to)
European integration emerged, like globalism versus nationalism, as a new and distinct social cleavage that has not easily been
internalized or prioritized by traditional political parties whose
core programs did not adapt to reflect its salience.41 New parties,
on the other hand, arose rapidly in response to this emerging societal cleavage and adopted strong and sometimes extreme
stances on it, and hence have attracted voters who were dissatisfied by the failure of traditional and mainstream parties to reflect
their views on the issue.42
The second development has been the gradual rise of the farright movement and far-right political parties across Europe.
This resurgence, which has been taking place over a number of
decades, has also generated an extensive academic literature,
much of which seeks to understand how a political movement that
was banished to the fringes after the defeat of Nazism following
World War II has reemerged considerably strengthened in many
European states and what the factors are which have led to its
reemergence.43 Theories include the successful reframing of the
far right that took place through the marriage of fervent nationalism presented as authentic civic values,44 with populist hostility
at http://perma.cc/JJ2C-4BGW. For an academic analysis, see Sarah B. Hobolt and
Catherine de Vries, Turning against the Union? The Impact of the Crisis on the Eurosceptic
Vote in the 2014 European Parliament Elections, 44 Elec Stud 504, 505 (2016).
41 See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises:
Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage, 25 J Eur Pub Pol 109, 119–20 (2018).
42 For an analysis of the 2014 European Parliament elections in particular, when
Eurosceptical parties won significant support, see Oliver Treib, The Voter Says No but
Nobody Listens: Causes and Consequences of the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European
Elections, 21 J Eur Pub Pol 1541, 1543–46 (2014).
43 For a few samples, see generally Roger Eatwell, The Rebirth of the ‘Extreme Right’
in Europe?, 53 Parliamentary Aff 407 (2000); John W.P. Veugelers, A Challenge for Political Sociology: The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Contemporary Western Europe, 47 Current
Sociology 78 (Oct 1999); Jens Rydgren, Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family, 44 Eur J Polit Rsrch 413 (2005). See also
Cas Mudde, Three Decades of Populist Right Parties in Europe: So What?, 52 Eur J Polit
Rsrch 1, 8 (2013) (warning of the effect that the far right would have on the political spectrum and predicting that it would not be destined to remain in opposition, but rather
would increasingly influence the policy agenda).
44 See Daphne Halikiopoulou, Steven Mock, and Sofia Vasilopoulou, The Civic Zeitgeist: Nationalism and Liberal Values in the European Radical Right, 19 Nations &
Nationalism 107, 109 (2013).
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against the establishment and anti-immigrant sentiment, as well
as the far right’s poaching of the economic policies of the socialdemocrat left, including a shift toward embracing redistributive
welfare policies (albeit for citizens only) and against policies of
austerity.45
The third relevant trend is the turn against so-called neoliberal capitalism.46 Unlike the other two trends described above,
this development began as a clearly left-wing movement,
spurred by intellectual critiques of capitalism and the global economic order from writers like Professor Noam Chomsky, Susan
George, Naomi Klein, and Professor Noreena Hertz, as well as
former Washington insiders like Professor Joseph Stiglitz.47 The
accompanying antiglobalization movement saw street protests
against the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in 1999
spread to various parts of the world, including to Europe, where
organizations like Association for the Taxation of Financial
Transactions and Aid to Citizens (ATTAC)48 and the European
Social Forum were established.49 However, with the onset of the
global financial crisis and the Euro crisis, the backlash against
the policies of austerity promoted by international organizations

45 On the recent borrowing by far-right parties of the economic welfarist and antiausterity policies of the left, see Audrey Sheehy, The Rise of the Far Right (Harvard
Political Review, Feb 11, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T4GE-WH2H (“The far right
is competing directly with the left on economic policy; however, the far right is exploiting
the rift in the left.”); Bojan Bugaric, Europe’s Nationalist Threat (American Prospect, May
18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/J39W-4FV4 (blaming the rise of populist right-wing
parties on the moderate parties’ embrace of fiscal austerity). For a discussion of the relationship between economic insecurity and the rise of far-right parties, see generally Tim
Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou, Why Far Right Parties Do Well at Times of Crisis:
The Role of Labour Market Institutions (European Trade Union Institute, July 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2FG2-5BLF; Daphne Halikiopoulou, Why Are Far Right Parties
Increasing Their Support across Europe? A Note on the French Election (HuffPost UK, Apr
21, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/MH38-EXUM.
46 See generally David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford 2005).
47 See generally Noam Chomsky, Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order
(Seven Stories 1999); Susan George, A Short History of Neoliberalism (Transnational
Institute, Mar 24, 1999), archived at http://perma.cc/P9Y7-ARK6; Naomi Klein, This
Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (Simon & Schuster 2014); Noreena Hertz,
The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (HarperBusiness
2003); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (Norton 2003).
48 Overview (ATTAC), archived at http://perma.cc/V39W-34J7. ATTAC describes itself as “an international organization involved in the alter-globalization movement. [It]
oppose[s] neo-liberal globalization and develop[s] social, ecological, and democratic alternatives so as to guarantee fundamental rights for all.” It is best known for its advocacy of
a so-called Tobin tax on international financial movements.
49 See Élise Féron, Anti-globalization Movements and the European Agenda: Between
Dependence and Disconnection, 17 Eur J Soc Sci Rsrch 119, 120 (2004).
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like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European
Union itself saw critiques of the global economic order spread well
beyond their origins on the left. As already noted, opposition to
austerity policies in various European states has more recently
come from all sides of the political spectrum and not just from the
left. Right-wing and far-right parties in countries including
France, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have
adopted antiglobalist and economically nationalist policies that
reject austerity and promote statist economic policies centered on
welfare.50 A relationship between economic insecurity and a rejection of globalism, including freer trade and open borders (and including rejection of the European Union), has been suggested by
a number of studies,51 even though cultural factors are also clearly
relevant to the rise in nationalist sentiment in the European
Union and elsewhere and to the rejection of internationalism.52
Nevertheless, even if the Euro crisis helped to fuel support for
extreme right-wing parties, it seems clear that the resurgence
and growth of these parties significantly predated the economic
crisis in the European Union, and that public hostility toward
immigration was a more salient factor than economic disruption
and austerity.53
How should the relationship between these three sets of developments be understood, when seeking to address the question
whether European integration has fueled the rise of illiberal authoritarianism? It seems clear that Euroscepticism has been a
feature of politics in many European states, most obviously since
the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and that opposition to
the European Union has been growing steadily in many member
50 See Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism:
Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash *2 (Harvard Kennedy School Research Working Paper 16-026, Aug 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/GTK6-LG9A.
51 See, for example, Brian Burgoon, Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by
Political Parties *14 (GINI Discussion Paper 14, Oct 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/BU6V-Y2JL; Anabel Kuntz, Eldad Davidov, and Moshe Semyonov, The
Dynamic Relations between Economic Conditions and Anti-immigrant Sentiment: A Natural Experiment in Times of the European Economic Crisis, 58 Intl J Comp Sociology 392,
396 (2017). See also generally Vlandas and Halikiopoulou, Why Far Right Parties Do Well
at Times of Crisis (cited in note 45).
52 See Inglehart and Norris, Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism at *27 (cited in
note 50).
53 See Matthew Goodwin, Europe’s Far Right: Don’t Blame the Eurozone Crisis
(Chatham House, Aug 15, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/E6X4-6MCS; Emily Schultheis,
A New Right-Wing Movement Rises in Austria (The Atlantic, Oct 16, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/U7Y8-RKYZ (discussing how the far right in Austria managed to succeed
in recent elections based on its anti-immigration platform).

2018]

Supranational Governance

351

states for over two decades, rising through the more recent period of the refugee crisis and economic crisis. However, it would
not be correct to infer that opposition to the European Union, or
Euroscepticism, provides the main explanation—or even a
dominant explanation—for the rise and revival of the far right
across Europe. Any easy inference of this kind is challenged by
the evidence that the resurgence of the right in Europe has been
a gradual trend unfolding over more than three decades, with origins and causes well before the rise of Euroscepticism or opposition to the EU form of supranational governance had emerged.54
At the same time, it is undeniable that far-right parties have exploited and benefited from the fact that mainstream parties
across the European continent have been overwhelmingly supportive of European integration and that the growing nationalism–
globalism and national–European cleavages were not reflected
adequately in the programs or policies of most of the traditional
parties.
Along these lines, Professor Renee Buhr has argued that extremist parties benefited from a social backlash against European
integration in the post-Maastricht period, at a stage when virtually all mainstream parties supported European integration.55 In
offering themselves as parties that provided a voice for concerns
about EU integration, these parties of the extreme right (and
some on the left that opposed EU membership or EU policies) benefited electorally from the pro-integration consensus of the mainstream parties. Further, the growing critique of neoliberal capitalism, which originated on the left of the political spectrum but
spread to the right in particular after the global financial crisis,
provided further grist to far-right parties that combine opposition
to the European Union and its single-market policies with economic and cultural nationalism. Hence the later and stronger
backlash after 2009, in the wake of the Euro crisis and the
broader economic crisis, against the market-liberalization and
austerity policies of the European Union brought further support
for far-right parties that also espoused and promoted populist
illiberalism.
A final point worth making is one that was raised by Professor
Peter Mair in 2006 when he suggested that Euroscepticism was
54 See Eatwell, 53 Parliamentary Aff at 408–09 (cited in note 43); Mudde, 52 Eur J
Polit Rsrch at 4 (cited in note 43).
55 See Renee L. Buhr, Seizing the Opportunity: Euroscepticism and Extremist Party
Success in the Post-Maastricht Era, 47 Govt & Opposition 544, 550 (2012).

352

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:337

something more than opposition to or skepticism toward the
European Union and its policies, but might be a form or species
of a more general trend that he called “polity-scepticism.”56 By
this he meant that Euroscepticism was not so much an objection
to the European Union as a form of regional integration, but actually seemed to be part of a broader democratic malaise manifesting itself in a growing lack of political engagement by citizens,
a disenchantment with politics and representative democracy,
and a lack of electoral or party engagement.57
To conclude, while there is clearly a relationship between opposition to the European Union, Euroscepticism, and a growth in
support for far-right parties that promote or espouse authoritarian illiberalism, it would be overstating the evidence to suggest
that European integration is responsible for the resurgence of
such parties, and that supranational governance is thus proving to be a challenge to liberal constitutionalism. Nevertheless,
Euroscepticism, together with a critique of global capitalism and
economic neoliberalism (which the European Union is considered
by at least a significant portion of its citizens to exemplify), and a
more general disaffection with the political system that has been
directed against the European Union as well as against mainstream domestic politics, has helped authoritarian and illiberal
parties to strengthen and expand.
Quite apart from the question of whether opposition to or
skepticism toward the European Union has fueled the rise in support for illiberal authoritarianism and the far right, however, is
the more general question whether there is something in the project and structure of European integration itself that poses a challenge to liberal constitutionalism.
III. IS THE PROJECT OF SUPRANATIONAL EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION A CHALLENGE TO LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM?
Has European integration undermined liberal constitutionalism? Or, put more positively, is there something about the project
of supranational governance established by the European Union

56 See generally Peter Mair, Polity-Scepticism, Party Failings, and the Challenge
to European Democracy (Netherland Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities
and Social Sciences Uhlenbeck Lecture 24, June 9, 2006), archived at
http://perma.cc/6N65-SAJP.
57 Id at *6.
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that in itself poses a challenge to liberal constitutionalism, understood in the terms described in the Symposium Introduction?58 To
answer this question requires reflection on what the relationship
of the European Union, considered as a form of supranational governance, is to liberal constitutionalism in general, and to national
liberal constitutionalism in particular.
At least in its earliest form, when a draft treaty establishing
a European Political Community was drawn up in 1952,59 the project of European integration arguably resembled a continentwide experiment in liberal constitutionalism. Under the terms
of the draft treaty there were to be political decisionmaking bodies modeled on national federal systems; a bill of rights in the
shape of the recently drafted ECHR was to be integrated into
the European political community; and the ECtHR in Strasbourg
was to be given jurisdiction over disputes arising under the new
treaty.60 This was an early federal vision for an integrated
European continent with a liberal democratic constitution and
system of government. As is well known, however, that vision
did not survive the rejection of the European Defence Treaty
by France in 1953, and with it the draft European Political
Community also disappeared.61
As a consequence of the failed experiment with the European
Defence Community and draft Political Community, the EEC,
which was established some years later by the Treaty of Rome,
was far from the fully fledged political community that had earlier been envisaged. The 1957 Treaty of Rome was deliberately
circumscribed in its scope and ambition, limited largely to the establishment of a common market, in part to avoid the fate that
had befallen the earlier attempts at European integration.62 Nevertheless, even in circumscribed form, the EEC reflected some of
the embryonic elements of a liberal democratic political system.
The EEC treaty included provision for a parliamentary assembly,
which although not initially to be directly elected, contained a
provision envisaging the introduction of direct elections at a later
58

See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 239 (cited in note 9).
See generally Richard T. Griffiths, Europe’s First Constitution: The European Political Community, 1952–1954 (Federal Trust 2000); Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not
Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor, 105 Am J Intl L 649 (2011).
60 See de Búrca, 105 Am J Intl L at 654–55 (cited in note 59).
61 For a detailed history of France’s role in this chain of events, see generally Rogelia
Pastor-Castro, The Quai d’Orsay and the European Defence Community Crisis of 1954, 91
Hist 386 (2006).
62 See de Búrca, 105 Am J Intl L at 664–65 (cited in note 59).
59
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date.63 Nevertheless, the new supranational organs of governance—the Commission and the Council of Ministers—and the division of powers between them, did not amount to the kind of politically accountable and representative government to be found
within most of the EU member states at the time. Further, while
a reasonably strong Court of Justice was created to adjudicate
on disputes under the treaty, there was no mention of human
rights, and despite the provision for judicial review of acts of the
European Community, access to judicial review for individuals
was fairly limited through restrictive locus standi provisions.64 By
comparison with the earlier draft European Political Community
treaty, any express reference to human rights or to the ECHR was
omitted from the EEC treaty.
Over the decades that followed, in a set of developments that
is by now well known, the European Parliament gradually became a directly elected body and eventually gained significant
lawmaking powers in conjunction with the Council of Ministers.65
Around the same time the ECJ, after initial hesitation in a number of cases that unsuccessfully tried to introduce ideas of human
rights from the German legal order into EU law,66 declared that
fundamental rights were part of EU law as unwritten general
principles of law, and this precipitated a period of gradual integration of human-rights provisions into the EU treaties and
through ECJ case law.67 Almost forty years after the creation of
the European Economic, Coal and Steel, and Atomic Energy
communities, the Maastricht Treaty transformed the European
Communities into the European Union. This was a union with its
own currency and a powerful lawmaking parliament, a union that
introduced a form of European citizenship for all member-state
nationals.68 The new TEU introduced by the Maastricht Treaty

63 For an account of the influence of federal ideas on the early period of European
integration, see Sergio Pistone, The Union of European Federalists: From the Foundation
to the Decision on Direct Election of the European Parliament (1946–1974) 194–95 (Giuffrè
Editore 2008).
64 See Eric Stein and G. Joseph Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Transnational and Federal Context, 70 Am J Intl L 219, 222–24 (1976).
65 For a general history of this process, see Francis Jacobs, Richard Corbett, and
Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament 13–16 (Cartermill 3d ed 1995).
66 See generally Manfred A. Dauses, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the
Community Legal Order, 10 Eur L Rev 398 (1985).
67 For discussion of this development by the ECJ, see de Búrca, 105 Am J Intl L at
668 (cited in note 59).
68 The Maastricht Treaty introduced TEU Article 8 (now known as Article 20 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union since the coming into force of the Lisbon
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contained prominent references to the ECHR and to the general
principles of EU law. In other words, even while the language of
statehood continued to be consciously avoided,69 the European
Union began to emerge as a real political union and to resemble
a system of liberal constitutionalism on a European scale.
A debate on whether the European Union had a constitution,
or could be considered as a constitutional order, which until then
had been the preserve of a few academic lawyers, began in earnest
after the Maastricht Treaty,70 and continued apace until the 2004
decision of the heads of state and government of the European
Union to establish a convention tasked with the drafting of a
treaty establishing a constitution for Europe.71 The drafting of
this treaty establishing a constitution for Europe proved in retrospect to be the high point of European constitutionalism thus
far, and the rejection of the treaty by popular referendum in the
Netherlands and France in 2005 signaled the end of the explicit
constitutional vision for the European Union.72 Such a defeat for
the treaty by way of a popular vote in two of the founding states
of the European Union meant that the formal EU constitutional
project was abandoned and the treaty remained unratified. Nevertheless, after a number of years of reflection and discussion
among the EU heads of state and government, the bulk of the
draft constitutional treaty, albeit shorn of the symbolic constitutional provisions that were taken to have been offensive to the
people of France and the Netherlands, was enacted into law as
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.73

Treaty in 2010), which provides that “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”
See TEU Art 20, 55 J EU C326 at 20–21.
69 For a debate on the pros and cons of a vision of EU “statehood,” see generally G.
Federico Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 Eur L J 29 (1998); J.H.H. Weiler,
Europe: The Case against the Case for Statehood, 4 Eur L J 43 (1998).
70 See generally, for example, Jean-Claude Piris, Does the European Union Have a
Constitution? Does It Need One? (Jean Monnet Center, 2000), archived at
http://perma.cc/X47M-XJL9; Neil Walker, EU Constitutionalism in the State Constitutional Tradition (EUI Law Working Paper No 2006/21, 2006), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z6UH-WLSL.
71 See generally Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 47 J EU C310 (2004).
72 See Rudolf Streinz, The European Constitution after the Failure of the Constitutional Treaty, 63 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 159, 170 (2008).
73 See generally Jan Wouters, Luc Verhey, and Philipp Kiiver, eds, European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon (Intersentia 2009). See also Gráinne de Búrca, Reflections on
the EU’s Path from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty *11 (Jean Monnet Working Paper No 3/2008, June 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/9UEF-64GE.
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While academic and public debate as to whether the European
Union had or needed a constitution abated for some time after the
failure of the constitutional treaty, one of the underlying questions from that earlier debate remained particularly salient: Was
the European Union in fact a constitutional order? One prominent
strand of scholarly literature following the Maastricht Treaty centered around a debate about whether or not the European Union
has a demos.74 The gist of the “no demos” argument was that because the European Union did not itself have a demos (a sufficiently unified people), it lacked the preconditions for genuine
democratic legitimacy as a polity.75 This view was contested, and
various competing theories of EU democracy—including the idea
that the European Union is best considered as a “demoicracy”—
were advanced.76 And yet, despite the ongoing debate about the
EU’s democratic legitimacy and democratic deficit,77 it seemed by
the time of the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty that the European
Union had come to include most of the other main elements of
a liberal constitutional system. It has a written constitutionlike set of treaties, including a Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The ECJ conducts rights-based judicial review, and the European
Parliament is directly elected. The treaties include a commitment
74 See generally, for example, Mette Jolly, A Demos for the European Union?, 25
Polit 12 (2005).
75 See J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the
German Maastricht Decision, 1 Eur L J 219, 222–24 (1995).
76 See generally, for example, Vivien A. Schmidt, Democracy and Legitimacy in the
European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput,’ 61 Polit Stud 2 (2013); Kalypso
Nicolaïdis, The Idea of European Demoicracy, in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis,
eds, Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 247 (Oxford 2012).
77 For one of the classic debates on the European Union’s “democratic deficit,” see
generally Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU:
A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J Common Mkt Stud 533 (2006); Giandomenico
Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4 Eur L J 5 (1998);
Andrew Moravcsik, The Myth of Europe’s “Democratic Deficit,” 43 Intereconomics 331
(2008). For some more recent contributions, see generally Antoine Vauchez, Democratizing
Europe (Palgrave 2016); Richard Bellamy and Sandra Kröger, Domesticating the Democratic Deficit? The Role of National Parliaments and Parties in the EU’s System of Governance, 67 Parliamentary Aff 437 (2012). Recently the debate on the European Union’s “democratic deficit” has moved beyond the realm of academic scholarship and into the
mainstream media. See, for example, Jennifer Rankin, Is the EU Undemocratic? (The
Guardian, June 13, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/T8W8-EZA4; How to Address the
EU’s Democratic Deficit (The Economist, Mar 23, 2017), online at http://www
.economist.com/news/special-report/21719196-institutions-need-reform-how-address-eus
-democratic-deficit (visited Oct 16, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable); Amanda Taub, The
E.U. Is Democratic. It Just Doesn’t Feel That Way (NY Times, June 29, 2016), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/world/europe/the-eu-is-democratic-it-just-doesnt
-feel-that-way.html?_r=1 (visited Oct 16, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
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to the rule of law (including a rule-of-law mechanism for disciplining states),78 and power is distributed across the various institutions in such a way as would appear to prevent any one institution
from dominating or concentrating power. Nevertheless, despite
parliamentary elections, a powerful European Parliament, democratically elected representatives in the Council of Ministers, a
legally enshrined principle of transparency, a strong EU court,
and various layers of legal and constitutional rights protection,
the European Union still lacks real responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens.79
Hence, as far as its democratic credentials are concerned,
there is an ongoing debate about the quality of democracy in
the European Union, focusing particularly on whether there is
a European people and on the lack of adequate responsiveness to
citizens within the EU system of governance. At the same time,
however, and despite this debate about its democratic responsiveness, the EU political system nonetheless includes and embodies
many of the key features of liberal constitutionalism. Indeed the
European Union formally insists, under Articles 2, 7, and 49 of
the TEU, on a commitment on the part of all of its member states
to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and has wrestled
in recent years with the question of how it should tackle democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland.80 In other words, despite contestation over the quality of democracy, the European
Union in the main is constructed as, and contains the main elements of, a liberal constitutional political system. Why then pose
the question whether the structure and functioning of European
supranational governance poses a risk to liberal constitutionalism? If the European Union is founded on the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and seeks to condition
accession to the European Union on adherence to these values,
how can it pose a challenge to them?

78 See TEU Art 7, 55 J EU C326 at 19–20; Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law *5 (Mar 19, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/Z77X-7RWG.
79 For an analysis of the issues underlying the European Union’s lack of political
responsiveness, see generally Simon Hix, What’s Wrong with the European Union and
How to Fix It (Polity 2008).
80 Article 2 reads, “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities,” with Articles 7 and 49 providing for cooperative
enforcement of these terms. TEU Arts 2, 7, 49, 55 J EU C326 at 17, 19–20, 43.
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One main reason is the risk that, whatever the strength and
quality of its own constitutional features and institutional structures, the functioning of the European Union may nonetheless
undermine rather than support or enhance the democratic constitutional systems of member states.81 There are a number of different if related dimensions of this risk. A first is the impact to
date of the articulation by the ECJ of a broad and fairly uncompromising principle of supremacy of EU law over national law.
One particular aspect of this concern that has recently been articulated is the issue of national identity, and the question
whether European integration in general and the operation of the
supremacy principle in particular have undermined important
aspects of national constitutional identity. A second concern is the
general trend toward “executive dominance” in the European
Union and its exacerbation by the technocratic and managerial
workings of the EU supranational institutions. Thirdly, there is
the impact of the European Union’s prioritization of its project of
economic liberalization over other domestic and transnational
goals, and particularly its impact on the functioning of national
social democracy.
Beginning with the principle of the supremacy, the idea of
the primacy of EU law over national law was first introduced by
the ECJ in the early 1960s,82 and gradually took hold across the
European Union.83 From as early as 1970, the court insisted on
the supremacy of EU law over all provisions of national law of
whatever rank, including provisions of the national constitution.84
Various aspects of the supremacy principle were challenged from
the outset, with particular concern being expressed over the
ECJ’s assertion that any binding and directly effective provision
of EU law—whatever its content—must in the interests of uniformity of EU law take precedence over any provision of national
constitutional law, even over basic constitutional rights. This
claim has generated controversy and pushback from domestic
constitutional courts ever since the first Solange judgment of the
81

See Dieter Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy 97–101 (Oxford 2017).
The foundational trio of cases introducing and articulating the scope of the supremacy of EU law over domestic law are Costa v ENEL, [1964] ECR 585; Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel,
[1970] ECR 1125; and Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA,
[1978] ECR 629.
83 See generally Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The
Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford 2001).
84 See generally Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125.
82
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Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Constitutional Court, in
1974.85 In that ruling, the court declared that the part of the constitution dealing with basic rights was an inalienable essential
feature of German constitutional law and that given the state of
the European Union at the time (when it was still the EEC with
fewer developed features of liberal constitutionalism, lacking a
directly elected parliament or an entrenched bill of rights), the
guarantees of basic rights in the German constitution would prevail over EU law in the event of conflict.86
And even though, as described above, the European Union has
developed significantly since that time and currently has a powerful directly elected parliament as well as a binding Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the controversy over the ECJ’s claim that EU
law must prevail over domestic constitutional rights has continued,
and a series of robust rulings have been given by a range of national
constitutional courts, including the Bundesverfassungsgericht, articulating limits to the operation of the principle of supremacy of
EU law. Cases—such as the Melloni reference to the ECJ from
the Spanish Constitutional Court involving a conflict between the
provisions of the EU Arrest Warrant and the right to a fair trial
in the Spanish Constitution,87 and the Taricco reference from the
Italian Constitutional Court involving a conflict between the principle of legality in Italian constitutional law and EU value-addedtax law88—demonstrate that the kinds of concerns expressed in
Solange I retain their significance. In other words, national
courts and other constituencies are concerned that EU law may
undermine domestic constitutional law by failing to respect the
specificity or importance of particular rights and protections
guaranteed as part of national constitutional law.
A related and more recently articulated aspect of the concern
over the operation of the supremacy principle is the question
whether it has weakened or undermined the national constitutional identity of EU member states. Liberal constitutionalism
has until now been developed within the nation-state context, as
a framework for the functioning of a healthy democratic political
system, and national constitutions generally purport to embody
or articulate elements of national identity. The European Union,
85 See generally Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
für Getreide und Futtermittel, [1974] 2 CMLR 540 (BVerfG) (“Solange I”).
86 Id at 550.
87 See generally Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, [2013] 2 CMLR 43 (ECJ).
88 See generally Taricco, [2016] 1 CMLR 21 (ECJ).
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however, is not a nation-state, and although it has effectively established a continent-wide system of liberal constitutionalism, its
democratic system remains relatively weak and noncontestatory,
and its identity is complex, contested, and polyphonous.89 Political
and popular concern about the process of European integration
undermining or weakening national identity,90 including national
constitutional identity, resulted in the addition in 2010 of a new
provision by the Lisbon Treaty (and previously by the unratified
Constitutional Treaty) to the TEU. Article 4(2) of the TEU now
provides that the European Union “shall respect the equality
of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.”91
This provision has already generated a voluminous academic
literature, with many applauding the move to provide treatybased recognition and protection for national constitutional identities.92 Others, however, have noted the paradoxical risk that this
provision may be invoked by governments like Hungary’s that are
deliberately undermining liberal constitutional safeguards
within their own political systems, and using the new provision
in Article 4(2) to ward off attempts by the European Union or
the ECJ to prevent them from doing so.93 Hence the impact of

89 See Janie Pélabay, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, and Justine Lacroix, Echoes and Polyphony: In Praise of Europe’s Narrative Diversity, in Justine Lacroix and Kalypso Nicolaïdis,
eds, European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts 334, 335
(Oxford 2010).
90 An earlier provision introduced by the Maastricht Treaty had provided that “the
Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States,” Maastricht Treaty Title I, Art F, 35 J EU C191 at 5, but had not referred to national constitutional identity.
The constitutional aspect of identity was added by the Lisbon Treaty. See Treaty of Lisbon
Art 1, § 5, 50 J EU C306 1, 12 (2007).
91 TEU Art 4(2), 55 J EU C326 at 18 (emphasis added).
92 See Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect
for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 Common Mkt L Rev 1417, 1418 (2011).
93 The Hungarian Constitutional Court invoked the idea of national constitutional
identity in a judgment in 2016, in relation to a decision of the European Union on the relocation of asylum seekers. See AB on the Interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental
Law, Decision 22/26. (XII. 5.), slip op at 16–17 (Hungary Const Ct Nov 30, 2016), archived
at http://perma.cc/36V6-AKEU. See also Gábor Halmai, National(ist) Constitutional Identity? Hungary’s Road to Abuse Constitutional Pluralism *10–11 (EUI Working Paper
2017/08, Aug 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/MU5T-C8BB. See also generally Theodore
Konstadinides, Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal
Order within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement, 13 Camb Yearbook
Eur Legal Stud 195 (2011); Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Llivina, eds, National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 2013). For a distinc-
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the European Union on national constitutional identity, insofar
as the question is whether it is likely to undermine liberal constitutionalism rather than to bolster or support it, seems not to be a
straightforwardly negative one. One way of expressing the relationship between the European Union and national constitutional
identity is to accept that European integration has challenged national constitutional identity, but not necessarily in a negative
way, and that it both supports the fundamental premises of liberal constitutionalism while at the same time sometimes challenging aspects of the way in which liberal constitutionalism is
interpreted in specific national contexts.
A second aspect of the concern that the European Union is
posing a challenge to domestic constitutional democracy relates
to the problem of executive dominance. The suggestion that there
may be a trade-off between democracy and transnational or global
governance was made in a different context in 1971 by Karl Kaiser.94 While transnational cooperation and interdependence—
including in the EU context—has been a strongly positive force in
all sorts of ways, the question is whether such interdependence,
even if it has reduced war and increased human welfare in many
ways, might also be linked with a weakening in the quality of existing state-based democratic governance. In the EU context, it
has been argued that the process of integration has given rise to
the gradual dominance of the executive branches, and has weakened the role, cogency, and effectiveness of domestic democratic
mechanisms and systems.95 Some have described the phenomenon
more sharply as “collusive delegation” by national governments
to transnational bodies and organizations, enabling governments
and executives to work collectively at the European and international level to achieve their goals in ways that deliberately bypass
national democratic institutions, and increasing concern that European (and global) governance institutions may be weakening or
tion between national identity and constitutional identity, see Elke Cloots, National Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the EU, 45.2 Netherlands J Legal Phil 82,
84–86 (2016).
94 See generally Karl Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic
Process, 25 Intl Org 706 (1971). For a more recent discussion of some of the tensions between international legal governance and democracy, see generally J.H.H. Weiler, The
Geology of International Law—Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZaöRV 547
(2004). For the opposite argument that multilateral and international institutions may enhance rather than undermine domestic democracy, see Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo,
and Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 Intl Org 1, 4 (2009).
95 See, for example, Deirdre Curtin, Challenging Executive Dominance in European
Democracy, 77 Mod L Rev 1, 16–17 (2014).
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undermining domestic democratic systems.96 It might even be argued that moral hazard is built into the establishment of many
international institutions, in that they allow or encourage domestic policymakers to bypass domestic democratic institutions and
disincentivize domestic democratic bodies from robust engagement with policies that are perceived to be within the purview of
transnational or foreign policy actors.97
A third strand of the critique that the European Union is undermining domestic constitutional democracy has been articulated for some years since the Maastricht Treaty, in particular by
a group of prominent German scholars including Professors Fritz
Scharpf, Claus Offe, Wolfgang Streeck, and Christian Joerges,
who focus on the way in which the EU treaties have promoted a
particular ordoliberal vision. They argue that the EU promotion
of transnational economic integration has prioritized “negative”
integration, the dismantling of regulatory barriers to interstate
trade, over positive integration to pursue welfare goals and protect social rights, and that this set of priorities has effectively
been written into EU treaties in a way that is difficult to change
and that overrides key domestic institutions and choices.98 A central aspect of their concern is that the European Union lacks the
institutional and social resources to pursue an active and adequate Europe-wide social policy, and yet through its deregulatory and monetary policies has weakened the capacity of national social democracies to fulfill their goals and undermined the
functioning of those democracies. After the onset of the Euro crisis in 2009, the expansion of technocratic governance and the imposition of austerity policies by the European Union and the IMF,
which have had such profoundly negative social effects on debtor
countries and particularly on Greece, added powerful grist and a

96 See Klaus Dieter Wolf, The New Raison d’État as a Problem for Democracy in
World Society, 5 Eur J Intl Rel 333, 335–36 (1999). For an application of this theory to EU
governance, see Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, International Governance as New Raison d’Etat?
The Case of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 10 Eur J Intl Rel 147 (2004).
97 I am grateful to Aziz Huq for this point.
98 See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, The Asymmetry of European Integration, or
Why the EU Cannot Be a “Social Market Economy” *12 (KFG Working Paper No 6, Sept
2009), archived at http://perma.cc/NJU5-FMAC; Claus Offe, The European Model of “Social” Capitalism: Can It Survive European Integration?, 11 J Polit Phil 437, 467 (2003);
Christian Joerges, Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in
the European Integration Process, 9 Comp Sociology 65, 70–72 (2010). See also generally
Steffen Lehndorff, ed, A Triumph of Failed Ideas: European Models of Capitalism in the
Crisis (ETUI 2012).
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new dimension to these critiques.99 The fact that fundamental
economic rules—whether free-movement and competition rules,
or excessive deficit provisions—are written into the EU treaties
and become effectively obligatory for member states means that
the space for domestic politics and contestation over such issues
is more or less closed. While this concern may seem to be more
about the impact of EU economic integration goals on domestic
welfare policies rather than its impact on liberal constitutionalism, the fact that social rights are written into the constitutions
of some member states, or that the welfare state or social democracy is an important component of the constitutional system of
certain member states (as in the German constitution’s guarantee
of a democratic and social federal state) brings the two issues
closer together.
CONCLUSION
This Essay began by reflecting on the relationship between
the EU system of supranational governance, the rise of illiberal
populism and authoritarianism, and the decline of liberal constitutionalism. Having considered whether the Brexit vote—
which has been widely seen as a kind of populist revolt against
a sovereignty-constraining European Union—was a part of this
trend, I concluded that while certain elements underpinning the
vote to leave the European Union reflected illiberal or authoritarian tendencies, the Brexit decision overall cannot be said to represent a move against liberal constitutionalism or in favor of illiberal authoritarianism. Similarly, although the spread of
Euroscepticism to which the deepening and expansion of
European integration gave rise has benefited extreme right-wing
movements and parties across Europe, the reemergence and
growth of the far right in various European states had begun well
before strong anti-EU sentiment became prevalent. Nevertheless,
as elaborated in the previous Part, even though the European
Union is itself now in many respects firmly committed to liberal
constitutionalism and to promoting the spread of democracy and
constitutionalism, the functioning of EU supranational governance has certainly challenged national constitutional institutions

99 See generally Wolfgang Streeck, Markets and Peoples: Democratic Capitalism and
European Integration, 73 New Left Rev 63 (Jan–Feb 2012). For a more developed version
of this argument, see generally Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of
Democratic Capitalism (Verso 2014).
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and norms in various ways. In particular, the inadequate responsiveness of EU governance institutions to citizens, the judicial
declaration of unconditional primacy of all EU laws over national
constitutional rights, the growth of executive dominance and
technocratic governance, and the bypassing of domestic parliamentary and democratic institutions, as well as the weakening of
state-based social democracy through the European Union’s prioritization of deregulatory and economically neoliberal policies
(highlighted prominently during the management of the Euro crisis) have been ongoing sources of concern.
Are these challenges to national liberal constitutionalism
intrinsic to the process of EU supranational governance, and an
inevitable consequence of the project of transnational integration? I suggest that while some of the challenges posed by EU supranational governance to national constitutionalism are indeed
intrinsic to the process of European integration, certain aspects
of this challenge are not necessarily a negative development. In
particular, the challenges posed to national constitutionalism and
national constitutional identity by Europe-wide liberal constitutionalism can and in some cases have created a constructive dialogue between the European Union and national judiciaries about
the meaning and scope of a given constitutional right, taking into
account the distinctive transnational context of the European
Union. For some of the other challenges, however, and in particular the risk of executive dominance and unresponsive technocratic governance, there is a real need for reflection and reform at
both the level of national government and at the EU level.
As far as the challenge of unconditional and judicially determined EU supremacy over domestic constitutional rights is concerned, a great deal has already been written about constitutional
pluralism in the European Union and the ability of national constitutional courts not to follow the rulings of the ECJ when they
are considered to threaten or undermine fundamental provisions
of the domestic constitutional order.100 At the same time, the development of greater trust between the ECJ and domestic constitutional courts would help in handling those cases in which an
apparent conflict between EU law and national constitutional
rights is at stake. Greater trust could encourage appropriate deference on the part of the ECJ in those cases in which an important
100 For book-length treatments, see generally Klemen Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (Oxford 2014); Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek, eds, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012).
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national constitutional right is at issue rather than being instrumentally invoked to avoid the application of EU law; thus, the
ECJ should pay close attention to the domestic values at stake
and the reason for the domestic court’s interpretation of a particular provision. It should also, however, help national constitutional courts to accept that membership in the European Union
has entailed a change to the national constitutional order and
that in some cases national constitutional law will have to adapt
to the new, transnational liberal constitutional order created by
the European Union. Hence the creation of liberal constitutional
order at the EU level has entailed a challenge to liberal constitutional orders at the national level, and this challenge is indeed
intrinsic to the project of European integration, but it does not
need to be seen as a negative development.
As far as the weakness in the democratic responsiveness of
the European Union and the tendency toward executive dominance, these are more serious problems and a challenge that urgently needs to be addressed. Most of the official reform proposals
that have been contemplated in recent years have centered on
further strengthening of the role of the European Parliament, or
in some cases minor enhancement of the role of national parliaments in the EU process. But such reforms are unlikely to address
the entrenched problems of the unresponsiveness of EU governance institutions,101 or to take sufficiently seriously the Lisbon
Treaty’s newly articulated commitment to EU democratic principles.102 The EU institutions—but also, it must be said, the governments of the member states themselves—have been notably ambivalent about more innovative proposals for involving civil
society in European governance and deepening the democratic re-

101 See, for example, Graham Smith, Trans-national Democratic Innovation in the
European Union: Flirting with Deliberative and Plebiscitary Design *9 (American Political
Science Association Presentation, Aug 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/M7AH-BMPF
(“Many of the evaluations of these experiments point towards the empowering effect of
engagement on participants, but then regret that the outputs of these designs failed to
have any effect on the European decision making process.”); Committee on Constitutional
Affairs, European Parliament, Method for Citizens’ Direct Participation in EU Member
States—Model for a More Democratic Europe *2–4 (Sept 18, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/KYL2-45BZ. See also generally Raphaël Kies and Patrizia Nanz, eds, Is
Europe Listening to Us? Successes and Failures of EU Citizen Consultations (Ashgate 2013).
102 See TEU Arts 10–12, 55 J EU C326 at 20–21.
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sponsiveness of the European Union, despite the range of interesting and ambitious suggestions that have been made in recent
years.103
A willingness to undertake such reforms necessarily entails
some risk, given the growth of popular opposition to the European
Union in recent years, and given how EU political leaders have
come to fear the use of devices like popular referenda. On the
other hand, the development of direct, deliberative, and grassroots forms of engagement is crucial to build genuine democratic
support for the EU project and to enable real participation on the
part of the governed in the shape of EU governance. Such initiatives should not be considered as alternatives to but as supplements to the existing elements of representative democracy
within the European Union. A process of reform needs to go beyond top-down or superficial forms of consultation or consent
seeking based on already-completed proposals drawn up by preselected groups, and needs to be genuinely open to novel and even
challenging ideas. Importantly, as others have pointed out, such
democratic engagement and reform should not be undertaken
merely in order to bolster the legitimacy and acceptability of previously taken steps of European integration.104 It is true that the
project of opening the EU governance process more to such participatory forms of democratic engagement and contestation carries risks, not just the risk of challenging “the constitutive issues,” 105 but also the risk of unmanageable governance in an
already very complex system. Yet these are risks that need to be
taken, if reforms are carefully designed with the risks in mind so
as to strengthen European democratic and constitutional governance rather than undermine it. A willingness to engage in deeper
democratic consultation and reform would also mean the European
Union confronting the third of the challenges articulated above,
namely the increasingly widespread opposition to the European
Union’s prioritization of economic integration over social goals
and, more generally, to the sense that the policies of austerity
103 For examples of reform proposals, see generally Richard Youngs, The EU beyond
the Crisis: The Unavoidable Challenge of Legitimacy (Carnegie Europe, Oct 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/7YPB-7AJ3; Stéphanie Hennette, et al, For a Treaty Democratizing Euro Area Governance—(T-Dem) (Social Europe, Apr 27, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/RY6Q-M4WS; Vauchez, Democratizing Europe (cited in note 77).
104 See Youngs, The EU beyond the Crisis at 12–13 (cited in note 103).
105 Stefano Bartolini, Should the Union be ‘Politicised’? Prospects and Risks, in Simon
Hix and Stefano Bartolini, eds, Politics: The Right or the Wrong Sort of Medicine for the
EU? *28, 44 (Notre Europe Policy Paper 19, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/LP8W-D4M4.
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pursued in the management of the Euro crisis have undermined
social democracy and other domestic welfare and constitutional
commitments.
To conclude, the project of supranational European integration clearly challenges the functioning of liberal constitutional democracy at the national level in various ways and, to some extent,
has posed challenges to the functioning of democracy that liberal
constitutionalism is designed to protect. Some of these challenges
are inevitable to a project of continent-wide integration and supranational governance, and some of them are positive challenges
to particularist elements of national constitutionalism posed by
the development of a system of liberal constitutionalism on this
continent-wide scale. However, the lack of adequate democratic
responsiveness of EU institutions, and the preference of memberstate governments for executive dominance at the supranational
level are dangerous problems for the European Union. Their adverse effects on domestic constitutional democracies require serious and committed reform, if the spread not just of Euroscepticism
but also of illiberal and authoritarian political forces in EU member states is to be tackled. Professor Timothy Garton Ash suggested recently that if the opposite of populism within the nationstate context is pluralism,106 then the opposite of populism
within the European context is the European Union itself.107 The
European Union at its best represents a response to Professor
Dani Rodrik’s globalization trilemma—which posits that we cannot simultaneously have deep economic integration, democratic
politics, and national sovereignty, because one of the three must
give108—in its creation of a system of supranational governance in
which the challenges to national constitutional democracies are
compensated for by a democratically responsive system of liberal
constitutionalism at the European level. But if it is indeed to meet
the challenge of Rodrik’s trilemma, and to meet the powerful challenges posed by the rise of populism in the European Union, the
European Union must take very seriously the need for democratic
and social reform and renewal of the European project.

106 For juxtaposition, see generally Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism?
(Pennsylvania 2016).
107 T. Garton Ash, Does European Populism Exist? 4:35 (Sept 18, 2017), online at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJC7JAOccfw (visited Oct 30, 2017) (Perma archive
unavailable).
108 See Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the
World Economy 200–02 (Norton 2011).

